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WALTER W. KERSHAW, 
Defendant-Appellant-Respondent, 
and 
HELEN G. KERSHAW, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
and 
WILLARD B. ROGERS, EDWARD 
B. ROGERS, and ROCKEFELLER 
LAND & LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. J 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
WALTER W. KERSHAW and HELEN G. KERSHAW 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
By cross-claim defendant-appellant, Rockefeller Land 
& Livestock Company, claims damages against defendants 
and respondents, Walter W. Kershaw and his wife, Helen 
G. Kershaw, for a claimed breach of warranty on transfer 
by quit claim deed to real property. 
Case No. 
13502 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The brief of defendant-appellant, Walter W. Kershaw, 
heretofore filed herein contains what we submit as a fair 
statement of the proceedings in the lower court. Without 
unnecessary repetition, we will elaborate more fully upon 
the cross-claim of Rockefeller Land & Livestock Com-
pany, hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Rockefeller". 
The two Rogers, Willard B. and Edward B., who own 
and control the company, joined in an answer to plain-
tiff Bradshaw's second amended complaint (R. 62-63). By 
a separate pleading served on December 5, 1971, Rocke-
feller filed an answer and counterclaim to plaintiff Brad-
shaw's second amended complaint asserting a prior claim 
to the 480 acres, a portion of the subject real property 
(R. 65-66). Helen G. Kershaw was first named as a party 
defendant by the cross-claim served on March 27, 1972 
(R. 68-69). The cross-claim demands $50,000.00 plus costs 
against the Kershaws, but in the body of the instrument 
the claim is conditioned upon Rockefeller not recovering 
the property described in Exhibit P-4. The company makes 
the allegation of an unqualified warranty subject only 
"to an interest of Grant D. Staples and Grace W. Staples, 
his wife." 
The Kershaws moved for a dismissal at the close of 
plaintiff's case and rested their side of the controversy 
should the motion to dismiss be denied. The witness 
Wankier, county supervisor of the Farmer's Home Ad-
ministration, was called out of turn by Mr. Kershaw but 
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this does not, in our view, alter the overall concept of 
the case presenting legal, as distinguished from factual, 
issues. We have heretofore failed to mention that Mr. 
Kershaw's counterclaim against plaintiff was dismissed 
on motion without prejudice early in the proceedings 
(Rep. Tr. 8). 
The Rogers and Rockefeller were content to rest 
their case after calling as their only witness Mr. Kershaw, 
who testified as an "adverse witness" thus permitting 
cross-examination by the Rogers on the one hand and the 
plaintiff Bradshaw on the other hand. The Rogers were 
content to rest their case upon the conclusion of the tes-
timony of Mr. Kershaw (Rep. Tr. 562). There was no 
proof of damage offered by the Rogers or their company. 
Before the jury was discharged, the trial court had 
requested and had received proposed instructions from 
both Bradshaw and the Rogers. The Rogers by their 
request No. 15 (R. 190), their request No. 16 (R. 191), 
and their request No. 19 (R. 194), asserted, in effect, 
that there was no factual issue to be resolved by the 
jury. We believe the record supports that concept. The 
construction of written documents and uncontradicted 
testimony with reference to the real and substantial fac-
tual issues remained the real thrust of Bradshaw's affir-
mative action and the cross-claim of Rockefeller. Any 
claimed error in discharging the jury was harmless and 
of no significance under Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Kershaws, husband and wife, defendants and 
respondents, seek to have this court affirm the dismissal 
of the cross-claim against them as asserted by appellant 
Rockefeller Land & Livestock Company. -
STATEMENT OF FACTS
 u 
Mr. Kershaw had an understanding with Milton 
Christensen that he, Christensen, would have until noon 
on November 15, 1970, to refinance his contract on the 
Kimball Ranch. Failing in this respect, Mr. Kershaw 
committed all of his holdings in Millard County, includ-
ing the Kimball Ranch, to the Rogers. The transaction 
was consummated on December 17, 1970, the date of the 
assignment, Rogers Exhibit D-7, which was recorded on 
December 22, 1970. The assignment included the 480 
acres described as Parcel No. 1 in the option agreement, 
P-4. On the same day, December 17, 1970, and recorded 
December 22, 1970, Walter W. Kershaw and Helen G. 
Kershaw, husband and wife, quit claimed all property 
interests to Rockefeller Land & Livestock Company (Rog-
ers Exhibit D-9). The exhibits were prepared by the 
Rogers in their office at Salt Lake City. The office is 
that of Utah Title and Abstract Company managed and 
operated by Edward B. Rogers (Rep. Tr. 561). The fact 
that the Rogers knew of the Staples Escrow is docu-
mented in the Rogers Exhibit D-7. 
The Rogers were present in the office of attorney 
Bayles when Mr. Kershaw repudiated the option. The 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Rogers were at all times advised by Mr. Kershaw that 
he was assigning to them no more or no less than he had 
contracted to receive from Marion Kesler, the 480 acres, 
and from Mrs. Staples, the 80 acres. Independent of those 
items, Mr. Kershaw transferred to the Rogers his equity 
in the Kimball property and certain personal items. 
The Rogers acknowledge that Christensen offered 
to sell them the option, P-4, for $2,500.00. The Rogers 
were obviously of the same opinion as was Mr. Kershaw 
that the option had no vitality otherwise ordinary pru-
dence would have dictated the advisability of taking 
Christensen out of the picture if only to mitigate possible 
damage and avoid further conflict. The record discloses 
that the Rogers were people of means and knew of the 
option (Rep. Tr. 555). The company had large holdings 
in Millard County. There was a calculated risk on the 
part of the Rogers; people sophisticated in land title, in 
ranching, and in business ventures. Mr. Kershaw, by his 
own admission, was not on a par with either plaintiff 
Bradshaw, the Rogers, or their company (Rep. Tr. 527). 
The testimony of Mr. Kershaw called as a witness 
by the Rogers and with respect to which there was no 
contradictory or rebuttal evidence, was to the effect that 
if the Rogers were not entirely satisfied and if they felt 
that there had not been a complete and full disclosure 
of all of the facts, they could rescind the transaction and 
receive back the check for $5,000.00 which would not be 
deposited by Mr. Kershaw until December 31,1970 (Rep. 
Tr. 549, 552-555). Mr. Kershaw reported a calculated 
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tax loss in 1970 of some $26,000.00 (Rep. Tr. 553). In 
dealing with the Rogers he disclaimed any interest in any 
property, real or personal, in the Staples Escrow except 
the 480 acres for which he had negotiated with Marion 
Kesler and which could not be isolated from the escrow 
until the entire Staples agreement had been paid out 
(Rep. Tr. 558). The Rogers were immediately advised 
of Christensen's claim under the option (Rep. Tr. 549). 
The quit claim deed speaks for itself as does the 
assignment. The latter instrument, Rogers Exhibit D-7, 
expressly limits any warranty or covenant relating to 
title to the buyers (Kesler) interest in the so-called 
Staples Escrow. Title to the 480 acres could not be ob-
tained until the payout of the Staples Escrow. 
The brief of appellants Rogers combines their con-
tentions with respect to Bradshaw and the contentions 
of the company as to Mr. and Mrs. Kershaw. Mrs. Ker-
shaw is appearing for the first time on the cross-claim 
and appellant Walter W. Kershaw is now in the role of 
a respondent against the same cross-claim being urged 
against his wife. The peculiarities of the situation require 
in addition to direct response, some oblique statements 




IT WAS NOT ERROR TO DISCHARGE THE 
JURY. 
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Extensive argument of counsel for the discharge of 
the jury, particularly in light of the fact that the counter-
claim of appellant Kershaw against Bradshaw had been 
dismissed, is contained in the Reporter's Transcript, Pages 
374-379. At the time respondent rested his case, the Ker-
shaws made a motion to dismiss (Rep. Tr. 489). There 
was again extensive comment by the trial court and all 
counsel and the Rogers, by their counsel, joined in the 
motion to dismiss Mrs. Kershaw from the action (Rep. 
Tr. 490-492). At that point in time, the Rogers, by their 
counsel, affirmatively moved the court to direct the jury 
to return a verdict of no cause of action with reference 
to the plaintiff's claims (Rep. Tr. 492-495). 
At that point appellant Walter W. Kershaw an-
nounced to the court that if his motion to dismiss was 
not granted, he would rest his case without adducing 
further evidence, he taking the position that the action 
was one in specific performance and that plaintiff had 
failed to make out a sufficient case for the court or the 
jury. It was at this juncture that the court granted the 
motion to dismiss the jury (Rep. Tr. 495-497). 
The comments of counsel concurring in the motion 
to dismiss and affirmatively moving for a directed verdict 
coupled with the requested instructions Nos. 15, 16, and 
19 and that the cross-claim be dismissed as against the 
alleged co-obligor, Helen G. Kershaw, was sufficient, we 
believe, to entitle the trial court to exercise a discretion-
ary prerogative with respect to dismissing the jury. The 
propriety of the trial court's action in that regard rings 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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loud and clear in the context of the cross-claimant's case 
being concluded at the close of the examination of appel-
lant Walter W. Kershaw, called as an adverse witness. 
There was no evidence of money damage. There was 
nothing left by way of a factual matter for a jury to de-
termine. 
Point III of the brief of appellant Rockefeller asserts 
erroneous factual issues claimed to have been within the 
prerogative of a jury. The contention that $100.00 was 
never paid as recited in the option, Exhibit P-4, that 
appellant Kershaw signed the option in blank, that the 
option was revoked, and that understandings between 
appellant Kershaw and the optionee Christensen were 
all before the court without contrary or rebutting testi-
mony of any consequence which would justify determina-
tion by a jury. 
The evidence is without contradiction to the effect 
that Christensen did present the option to the Farmer's 
Home Administration Agency and that as Mr. Kershaw's 
agent, Christensen was authorized to complete the docu-
ment as he saw fit to accomplish the mutual purpose of 
rehabilitating and refinancing his position with respect 
to the Kimball Ranch. All of these matters were known 
to Bradshaw as well as the continuing effect of the Staples 
Escrow. Christensen's testimony, called as a witness by 
Bradshaw, was binding upon the latter and he, Bradshaw, 
knew that the 480 acres could not be the matter of title 
negotiation until there was a payout under the escrow 
agreement. Furthermore, Bradshaw testified that his in-
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terest was limited to the 480 acres and that he could not 
see his way clear to buy the other property including the 
Kimball Ranch (Rep. Tr. 367). 
Point IV of the Rogers brief comments on claimed 
factual matters in relation to "tender of acceptance". The 
same factual misconception is contained within Point I 
of their brief. The tender of performance is erroneously 
equated with the letter from attorney Bayles. The phil-
osophy of Holland vs. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P. 2d 
989 (1960), was before the trial court without any factual 
dispute and for what effect it might have in weighing the 
equitable principles of specific performance, a burden im-
posed upon respondent and which we contend he did not 
meeX/. 
POINT II. 
THE ROGERS POINT IV. 
We subscribe to the degree of certainty and the 
various other elements that must be determined on the 
equity side of the court in an action for specific perform-
ance and that the trial court erred in requiring a warranty 
deed from appellant Kershaw to Bradshaw. On this issue 
the Rogers, however, confuse Helen G. Kershaw with Dor-
othy W. Kershaw. Dorothy is a stranger to the record 
and to these proceedings. Helen, at the time of the tran-
saction with the Rogers and at the time of trial, was and 
still is the wife of Walter W. Kershaw. 
The trial court found that there was no proof of the 
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marital status of Walter W. Kershaw at the time of the 
option agreement and that there was no privity of con-
tract, express or implied, between Helen and Bradshaw 
(R. 224). The trial court, however, in its finding No. 8 
(R. 225) was in error in describing the tender made by 
Bradshaw on January 8, 1971, as identifying Dorothy as 
being at that time the wife of Walter W. Kershaw. 
The finding recites that Bradshaw offered to pay the 
balance of the money held by Security Title Company 
as escrow agent to Walter W. Kershaw upon receipt of 
"a warranty deed executed by Defendant, Walter W. 
Kershaw and his wife'9. The deed and escrow instructions 
required the signature of Dorothy W. Kershaw and it is 
a matter of record that on December 22, 1970, it was 
Helen G. Kershaw and not Dorothy who was the wife of 
Walter. There was no evidence of any change in the 
marital status from December 22, 1970, to January 8, 
1971. The requirement in the escrow instructions that 
Dorothy Kershaw sign the deed as the wife of Walter 
was a requirement prerequisite to the payment of money, 
a condition out of the blue and clearly beyond any con-
tractual commitment. 
The Rogers confuse the letter from attorney Bayles 
on December 1 as being a tender of performance. This 
letter merely confirms the contention that Christensen 
claimed the option to be a viable instrument as of that 
date. Christensen, in testifying for the plaintiff, repudi-
ated his understanding with appellant Kershaw to the 
effect that all of the latter's real property interests in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Millard County were to be refinanced through the F. H. A. 
to the mutual advantage of both Christensen and Ker-
shaw. Christensen by his activities in December, both 
with respect to the Rogers in considering selling the 
option to them for $2,500.00 and his dealings with Brad-
shaw in selling the option for $5,000.00 with a down-pay-
ment of $500.00 and the balance to be paid dependent 
upon the outcome of this litigation repudiated his rela-
tionship with Kershaw. Christensen testified by way of 
justification in dealing with the property as his own, 
"Loss of interest in the property due to the fact that I 
did not have the Kimball property immediately to the 
west of it" (Rep. Tr. 194). 
The tender of performance was the document, Ex-
hibit P-9, the Escrow Instructions Letter, attached to 
which was the warranty deed to be signed by Walter and 
Dorothy Kershaw. Paragraph No. 2 under the title "In-
structions" of Exhibit P-9 states that of the money de-
posited with the escrow holder, the check to be delivered 
must be made payable to "Walter W. Kershaw and Grace 
W. Staples, individually and as Guardian of the Estate 
of Grant D. Staples". 
The instructions to the escrow holder as last above 
quoted should have been mentioned in our prior brief. 
We submit that the condition requiring payment to Grace 
W. Staples, individually or in a representative capacity, 
is an uncertainty recognized by the respondent, going to 
the heart of the uncertainties and ambiguities of the op-
tion agreement, Exhibit P-4. It is one man's interpreta-
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tion of the language used with respect to both Parcel Nos. 
1 and 2 as described in the option. How about the opinion 
of another man that Marion Kesler had an interest in 
the proceeds of the check? How about the opinion of 
still another individual that it was Kershaw who was 
obligated, if at all, to make peace with his predecessors 
in interest if a warranty deed was to be exacted. These 
uncertainties and inconsistencies should defeat the equit-
able application of specific performance. 
POINT III. 
THE ROGERS HAVE NO CLAIM FOR DAM-
AGE AGAINST THE KERSHAWS. 
The claim of $42,500.00 is without any support what-
soever in the record. This alone should be sufficient an-
swer to Point V in the Rogers brief. The record is clear 
that the Rogers knew that Christensen was claiming the 
option agreement to be a viable instrument, they knew 
that Christensen was attempting to deal with it to his 
own personal advantage with Bradshaw and even the 
Rogers. The Rogers knew of all adverse claims and on 
December 31, 1971, before their check was negotiated, 
they were given an opportunity to back away from the 
transaction. 
The Rogers knew of the Staples Escrow and that 
the 480 acres could not be severed until there was a pay-
out under the escrow and that all Kershaw was purchas-
ing out of the escrow was the 480 acres. The Rogers 
prepared the assignment, Rogers Exhibit D-7, and the 
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quit claim deed, Rogers Exhibit D-9. They are sophisti-
cated individuals with respect to title. Their business is 
known as Utah Title Abstract Company. On Page 20 
of their brief, they quote from the assignment to the effect 
that the warranty of the assignor is limited to the inter-
ests of the "buyers". 
The alleged warranty, for whatever it may be worth, 
had to do only with the buyer's interest under the Staples 
Escrow agreement. The transaction with Rockefeller 
Land & Livestock Company was by quit claim so far as 
the property in the option agreement, Exhibit P-4, is con-
cerned. The $5,000.00 covered all interests of appellant 
Kershaw in his property holdings in Millard County and 
he made no representation of title. There was no proof 
and there can be no claim of damage under the circum-
stances indicated which includes the opportunity to miti-
gate any possible damage by buying the option from 
Christensen for $2,500.00. 
CONCLUSION 
By comparison of the two briefs, that of appellant 
Kershaw and that of appellants Rogers, there is a com-
mon interest in a number of respects. As far as respon-
dent Bradshaw is concerned, there is a common interest 
in the discharge of the jury, but as to Bradshaw, that is 
where the trail ends. It is submitted that the trial court 
misinterpreted Exhibit P-4 and failed to recognize that 
the Bradshaw tender was nothing more than a counter-
proposal, and that under all of the undisputed facts and 
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circumstances, Bradshaw was not entitled to a warranty 
deed by way of specific performance. 
Appellant Kershaw is in the middle of two sophisti-
cated and knowledgable land owners, both of whom, in 
their own way, are seeking to capitalize upon the conduct 
of Mr. Kershaw which, in retrospect was careless and 
inept (Rep. Tr. 527). Mr. Kershaw's conduct was that 
of an individual who was not overreaching, who was not 
deceptive, and who dealt with both Christensen and the 
Rogers in the best of faith and after making full and com-
plete disclosures. The only out-of-pocket money for 
which there was no value received was $500.00 paid by 
Bradshaw to Christensen. Bradshaw knew that Christen-
sen was dealing on his own account, in repudiation of 
his relationship of trust and confidence with Mr. Kershaw, 
and he, Bradshaw, should not be heard to complain. 
All affirmative claims against appellant Walter W. 
Kershaw and respondent Helen G. Kershaw by Bradshaw 
and by Rockefeller Land & Livestock Company should 
be dismissed with costs herein incurred. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN & GUSTIN 
By Harley W. Gustin 
Paul H. Liapis 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Walter W. and 
Helen G. Kershaw 
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